Toward a Theory of the Dubject: Doubling and Spacing the Self in Canadian Media Culture by McCutcheon, Mark A.
235
Toward a Theory of the Dubject: 
Doubling and Spacing the Self  
in Canadian Media Culture
Mark A .  McCutcheon
Electronic storage devices function as an extension of our own 
memory. They are capable of storing our thoughts.
J u d g e  D e a n  P r e g e s o n
One of the things our grandchildren will find quaintest about  
us is that we distinguish the digital from the real.
W i l l i a m  G i b s o n
In David Cronenberg’s 1983 cult film Videodrome, an early scene, 
which stages a television interview, signals that the going is 
about to get deeply weird when one of the three interview guests 
is wheeled onto the set as a television set. Joining the film’s pro-
tagonist (Max Renn, played by James Woods) and love interest 
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(Nicki Brand, played by Debbie Harry) is a T V  set showing a 
close-up of Professor Brian O’Blivion, a “media prophet” who, 
with his first lines in this interview scene, identifies himself as 
a nearly transparent parody of Marshall McLuhan. To the T V 
interviewer’s first question, Dr. O’Blivion responds that “the 
television screen has become the retina of the mind’s eye” and, 
as though to explain this cryptic claim, then says: “That’s why 
I refuse to appear on television, except on television.” Parked 
centre stage on the set, between the interviewer and the protag-
onists, O’Blivion looks uncannily from one speaker to another 
as though he were present on the set. Throughout the film, 
O’Blivion only ever appears on a T V screen. In a subsequent 
scene, which marks the film’s decisive departure from realism 
into surrealism, the protagonist watches a taped recording of 
O’Blivion in which he starts addressing the viewer directly, as 
the T V set on which he appears begins to take on a monstrous 
life of its own. Towards the film’s end, we learn that O’Blivion 
has died before the film’s diegetic time — before the interview 
— and has “lived” for some time only as a private library of 
videotapes. “This is him,” O’Blivion’s daughter-turned-curator 
explains to Renn. “This is all that’s left. . . . He made thousands 
of them, sometimes three or four [tapes] a day. I keep him alive 
as best I can. . . . He became convinced that public life on tele-
vision was more real than private life in the flesh. He wasn’t 
afraid to let his body die.” As a bank of videotapes occupying 
some uncanny kind of afterlife, Brian O’Blivion embodies, in 
fictional form, a kind of radically remediated and redistributed 
subjectivity — an uploaded, transmitted, and somehow still 
interactive subjectivity: a dubjectivity.
In recent articles on social media (“Ipsographing the Dub-
ject”) and Canadian cinema (“Frankenstein”), I have suggested 
the figure of the dubject as a postmodern form of mediatized 
and remediated subjectivity, assembled through technologies 
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of mechanical reproduction and distributed through networks 
of electronic distribution that blur the boundaries between 
performance and recording, consumer and commodity, the 
organic self and its technological others. The dubject is a self 
committed to its own recording; a subject translated from the 
site of the individual body to the mediated spaces of represen-
tation; a self dubbed and doubled — a doppelgänger self whose 
“live,” corporeal presence becomes radically supplemented (in 
the deconstructive sense of the term) by its different and dis-
tributed embodiments in recordings and representations. The 
dubject is a kind of subject whose corporeally embodied self-
consciousness and experience of self are less accompanied than 
displaced, even deterritorialized, by mediated embodiments 
and iterations of oneself. In some cases, the trajectory of this 
displacement becomes a strategy of survival, a tactical retreat: 
from the real into simulation, from the flesh into the word. 
What’s more, such processes of dubjection seem specifically 
prominent in — and contingent on — cultural and economic 
conditions peculiar to Canada and its place in contemporary 
globalization. Examples of dubject formation on this account 
abound in Canadian culture, not only in fictional represen-
tations like that of O’Blivion in Videodrome but also, more 
strangely, in reality, as will be suggested with reference to 
specific Canadian cultural producers and creative practitioners. 
It must be said, at this point, that one of the effects of a theory 
of the dubject may be to blur the distinction between fiction 
and reality even more than poststructuralist and postmodern 
theories of representation already have. I do not take the speci-
ficity of the Canadian contexts that inform this theorization 
to entail any claim to national exclusivity or priority for it. 
That dub is integral to the proposed theory points to just one 
of its globalized, diasporic involvements. This preliminary 
inquiry merely suggests that certain Canadian contexts and 
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experiences have contributed to a certain tradition in practices 
of representation and mediation that signal some potentially 
wider — and weirder — implications for everyday life in the 
overdeveloped, technologically overdriven, and hypermediated 
Western world today.
Accordingly, the present essay explores more extensively this 
preliminary theory of dubjectivity by considering the example 
of Videodrome’s O’Blivion and a selection of other Canadian 
cultural texts: the linguistic-turn allegory of Tony Burgess’s 
novel Pontypool Changes Everything and its film version Pon-
typool; the remote-signing invention of Margaret Atwood; and 
the recording career of virtuoso pianist Glenn Gould. Taken 
together, these cases and texts illustrate the contextual, dis-
cursive, performative, and productive parameters of a theory 
for rethinking the category and constitution of the subject in 
the postmodern network society, of which Canada represents as 
exemplary a provisional site for concrete analysis as any other 
overdeveloped Western state and to which it also brings its own 
peculiar, postcolonial culture of technological nationalism, or 
rather technological transnationalism.
At the intersection of “the technological imaginary” (Genosko 
xxxvi) and “the transnational matrix” of globalization (Moylan 
184), the problematic of technological transnationalism pro-
poses a revision of the “technological nationalism” that Maurice 
Charland theorized in his eponymous 1986 article (206). Can-
adian postmodernist Arthur Kroker took up the term in Technol-
ogy and the Canadian Mind (10), hailing it as “the essence of the 
Canadian state and . . . the Canadian identity” (10), an effect of 
Canada’s geo-historical position, “between . . . the ‘technological 
imperative’ in American empire and the classical origins of the 
technological dynamo in European history” (7). However, Kroker 
left his keywords largely unexamined: he held Canada, technol-
ogy, and nation to be self-evident. But as a rudimentary model 
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of Canadian postcoloniality, “technological nationalism” may 
be reconsidered now as a kind of transnationalism, thus evok-
ing the transgression and transcendence of national borders 
(Clingman 129) but also the transplanting and transforming 
of national forms (Balibar viii, 176). Grounded by postcolonial 
contexts like cultural imperialism and neoliberal hegemony that 
overdetermine Canadian citizenship and sovereignty, the figure 
of the dubject articulates a complex problematic of identity and 
belonging in the context of cultural globalization.
Canadian dubjectivity entails both a transnational spacing 
— the remediated “extension of our own bodies and senses” — 
and a technological doubling — the “lease [of] our central nerv-
ous systems to various corporations” (McLuhan, Understanding 
99–100). The dubject takes form in multimedia bricolage and in 
a redistribution of the products of that bricolage, a redistribu-
tion that is at once an infiltration and a dispossession. As a 
factitious, tessellated form of identity, dubjectivity might be 
understood as the national mediascape’s counterpart to the 
state’s ethnoscape of multiculturalism, which for postcolonial 
critics like Neil Lazarus is “the strict ideological correlate of 
transnational capitalism” (223). Read as a symptom of Can-
ada’s colonial experience of various cultural and media empires, 
dubjectivity remixes the individual citizen in a manner not 
unlike that in which Canadian multicultural policy reimagines 
the national citizenry: as the commodity of a global market, a 
product of competing intellectual property claims, a consumer 
of media consumed by media.
F R O M  S U B J E C T  T O  D U B J E C T
Before turning to the illustrative cases I want to discuss, some 
reflections on the proposed portmanteau are in order. Why re-
mix the subject with dub as a prefix? While the category of the 
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subject traditionally has described an ontology of individual 
selfhood as “unified, self-present, self-determining, autono-
mous, and homogenous” (Hawthorn 180), the linguistic and cul-
tural turns effected, in the postwar period, by humanities and 
social science research, in general, and by continental critical 
theory, in particular, have displaced that essentialist ontology 
of subjectivity with a socially constructed reconceptualization 
of the subject as “secondary, constructed (by language, or ideol-
ogy, for instance), volatile, standing in its own shadow, and 
self-divided” (180). Judith Butler, in The Psychic Life of Power, 
undertakes an extensive theorization of the fundamentally 
paradoxical relationship between subjectivity and power: “Sub-
jection consists precisely in this fundamental dependency on a 
discourse we never chose but that, paradoxically, initiates and 
sustains our agency” (2). Butler acknowledges the discursive 
and linguistic constitution of the subject: “Individuals come to 
occupy the site of the subject (the subject simultaneously emer-
ges as a ‘site’), and they enjoy intelligibility only to the extent 
that they are, as it were, first established in language” (10–11). 
Working from psychoanalytic as well as poststructuralist theor-
ies, Butler considers the subject’s linguistic constitution and its 
paradoxical “modality of power” (6) as aspects of the subject’s 
founding division, “a splitting and reversal constitutive of the 
subject itself” as a site of “the reiteration of power” (15–16). 
Butler analyzes theories of subjection in order to ask “how we 
might make such a conception of the subject work as a notion 
of political agency in postliberatory times” (18); she works out 
this notion by rethinking the subject not as a formed product 
but as a process of becoming, “an uneasy practice of repeti-
tion and its risks, compelled yet incomplete . . . a repetition 
that risks life — in its current organization” (29–30). Given 
the recognition of self-division and repetition already inte-
grated into the social-constructionist theory of subjectivity, 
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what then does this theory gain by remixing its keyword as 
dubjectivity?
For one thing, it gains gain itself: gain understood in the 
technical sense it has for audio electronics, as the ability to 
increase or amplify a signal’s power. Boosting certain signals is 
one of the bases of dub: as historians of DJ  culture Bill Brough-
ton and Frank Brewster summarize it, “a dub mix is essentially 
the bare bones of a track with the bass turned up . . . adding 
space to a track, [so] what is left has far more impact” (128). Just 
as dub is not a process of original composition but of remix-
ing and reconfiguring extant works, a theory of the dubject is 
not attempting to invent or advance an entirely new model of 
social selfhood but rather to adapt, modify, and modulate the 
social-constructionist model: to amplify its contingency on, 
overdeterminations by, and articulations of media practices; to 
make it resonate more clearly with the media- and technoscapes 
of postmodern globalization; to bring a new emphasis on space 
as counterpoint to the social-constructionist model’s “temporal” 
bias (Butler 30).
To mix dub into the subject is to sample for its contemporary 
productions one specific contingency of mediation in postwar 
black Atlantic music: dub, the “reducing” of instrumental “tracks 
to their basslines and rhythms” and the “foregrounding [of] 
certain instruments in the mix,” recording studio practices that 
have become widely and rightly celebrated for influencing “every 
significant development in popular music since the 1960s” and 
for “laying the foundations for remix culture” (Shapiro 50–51). 
Erik Davis’s explication of dub is worth quoting at length:
To create dub, producers and engineers manipulate preexisting 
tracks of music . . . strip the music down to the bare bones of 
rhythm and then build it up again through layers of inhuman 
echoes, electronic ectoplasm, cosmic rays. Good dub sounds like 
the recording studio itself has begun to hallucinate.
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Dub arose from doubling — the common Jamaican practice 
of reconfiguring or “versioning” a prerecorded track into any 
number of new songs. Dub calls the apparent “authenticity” 
of roots reggae into question because dub destroys the 
holistic integrity of singer and song. It proclaims a primary 
postmodern law: there is no original, no first ground, no 
homeland. By mutating its repetitions of previously used 
material, dub adds something new and distinctly uncanny, 
vaporizing into a kind of doppelgänger music. Despite the crisp 
attack of its drums and the heaviness of its bass, it swoops 
through empty space, spectral and disembodied. Like ganja, 
dub opens the “inner door.” John Corbett even links the 
etymology of the word “dub” with duppie (Jamaican patois 
for ghost). . . . Dub music not only drums up the ghost in the 
machine, but gives the ghost room to dance. (“Dub, Scratch, 
and the Black Star”)
These definitions and interpretations of dub suggest several 
reasons for overdubbing the subject.
1. Articulating embodiment. That two of these definitions share, 
in their trope of the “bare bones,” an emphasis on articulation, 
in its anatomical and expressive senses, should help to prevent 
the argument here from being misread as a “continuation of 
the rationalist dream of disembodied mind” (Penny, qtd. in 
Bolter and Grusin 252). The practices that constitute dubjection 
as discussed here could all too easily be taken to reinforce the 
Cartesian, masculinist division of mind and body. Instead, fol-
lowing studies of new media and subjectivity by thinkers like 
Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Sherry Turkle, and Donna 
Haraway, I want to recognize the quite formidable materiality 
of both subject formation and its mediations, processes com-
monly assumed to be immaterial. “To say, for example, that 
the self is expressed in its email affiliations,” write Bolter and 
Grusin, “is not to say that the self is disembodied but that it is 
embodied in a particular mediated form” (234). For Haraway, 
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the miniaturization and outsourcing of electronic technology 
mystify its materiality and make it mobile; moreover, such 
technology is, fundamentally and fatally, “about consciousness 
— or its simulation” (153). Even Marshall McLuhan’s media 
theory, on which these more recent thinkers found their own 
work, posits the materiality of media practices, for example in 
the tactile titular pun of his popular 1967 book, the Medium Is 
the Massage. Dub’s origins in dance music production and the 
bodily affecting preponderance of bass in its methods help the 
proposed portmanteau to articulate both the materiality and 
mediation of embodiment even as the theory problematizes 
and defamiliarizes what we mean by materiality, mediation, 
and embodiment. “Feminist theory recognizes the body as both 
a medium and an element in the interplay of contemporary 
media,” write Bolter and Grusin. “The interaction of technol-
ogy and the body today comes . . . through the ways in which 
visual and verbal media present the body and participate in the 
definition of the self” (254).
2. Doubling. “Dub arose from doubling . . . ‘versioning’ a prere-
corded track”; and dub’s media act as a medium, channeling the 
black Atlantic hauntology of duppies, ghosts, spectres, uncanny 
doubles (Derrida, Spectres 161; Brand 49). The doubling of sub-
jectivities in the context of media is, of course, very different 
than the racialized doubling of consciousness theorized by black 
diasporic intellectuals like Dubois, Fanon, Brand, and Gilroy. 
What dubjectivity and double consciousness, while very differ-
ently contextualized, may share is a sense of the connection 
between deracination and representation, the difference of 
repetition, the internalized and projected distinction between 
an internal and a projected self.
In Videodrome, O’Blivion’s remediated appearances and or-
acular statements exemplify the uncanny doubling conjured by 
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the dubject. The term remediation, which I have borrowed from 
Bolter and Grusin, itself inscribes a doubling movement that 
makes it most suitable to the present discussion. Remediation 
is their term for the “double logic” by which new and old media 
alike strive, simultaneously, for both transparent immediacy 
and “hypermediation,” a preoccupation with media forms (rem-
iniscent of McLuhan’s maxim that the content of new media 
is old media: theatre as the “content” of film, for example, and 
film as the content of television [19]). Bolter and Grusin’s claim 
that “we are that which the film or television camera is trained 
on, and at the same time we are the camera itself” (231) echoes 
O’Blivion’s own claim that “the television screen has become 
the retina of the mind’s eye.” O’Blivion embodies the uncanny 
double, the doppelgänger character of the dubject. Is he alive 
or dead? Good guy or bad guy? Present or absent? Corporeal 
or cathode? Inspired or insane? Public or private? Real or im-
agined? Himself or someone else? Both or neither? Only a few 
of these questions receive any answer in the scene that presents 
the “real” O’Blivion, embodied as the tape library, and these 
answers are at best speculative and provisional; the other ques-
tions contribute to the radical ambiguity of the whole film. 
Moreover, O’Blivion’s role as an explanatory “father-figure” 
(Beard 143) is doubled; he shares this role with the CEO Barry 
Convex, whose corporate profiteering contrasts O’Blivion’s 
public-interest projects. What’s more, O’Blivion’s character is 
a roman à clef fictional double for Marshall McLuhan, who had 
died some three years before the film’s release (though not of 
the brain tumour from which he and his fictional counterpart 
both suffered). And still more: O’Blivion’s every appearance in 
Videodrome doubles the form of the film itself, mediatizing its 
cinematic frame by inserting a second, video frame within it; 
the film often exploits this formal doubling for mise en abyme 
effects that heighten its disorienting efforts. Mediatization is 
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not the same as remediation, although it is related: in Philip 
Auslander’s adapted use of this term (which he borrows from 
Baudrillard), it describes performance practices that incorpor-
ate other media: “‘mediatized performance’ is performance 
that is circulated on television, as audio or video recordings, 
and in other forms based in technologies of reproduction” (5). 
As we will see with reference to the other Canadian texts and 
producers sampled below, the experience of uncanny doubling 
— of being shadowed or haunted by one’s remediated double 
— becomes a recurring preoccupation and thus a defining di-
mension of dubjection.
The multiple ways in which O’Blivion enacts diegetic doub-
lings and embodies formal doublings dramatize the uncanny 
qualities of dub processes and their significance for a theory 
of dubjection. The “versioning” of dub is not the making of 
an identical duplication but “adding space”: simultaneously 
reducing (“stripping down”) and rebuilding or, in a word, de-
constructing. Supplementing. The deconstructive supplement 
differentiates, defers, displaces that to which it is attached; as 
theorized by Jacques Derrida, the supplement not only adds 
to but replaces that which it supplements (Grammatology 145). 
In this way, the supplement poses a lethal threat. As Avital 
Ronnell summarizes Derrida’s history of writing itself as the 
“degraded” and deadly supplement of speech: “Writing is not 
nontechnological, obviously . . . it’s already on the side of death 
and technology” (59). The uncanny quality of doubling obtains 
in precisely this, its supplementary movement between life 
and death, a movement that disrupts and confounds this basic 
ontological division. Commentators on various forms of re-
cording media have noted their dangerous supplementarity: 
Simon Reynolds writes of “sampladelic” music like dub that 
it constitutes a composite sonic “chimera” (45); similarly, of 
celluloid film, William Nestrick writes that it “animates” its 
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subjects into an uncanny afterlife (294–96). In Videodrome, not 
only does O’Blivion destabilize the border between life and 
death, but engenders his own supplement in the protagonist 
Renn, who, in the last scene, appears to translate his own self 
into the uncanny space of the T V screen, in the act of destroying 
his own corporeal body.
3. Spacing: The deferrals and displacements of the supplement 
bridge the doubling and spacing characteristics of dub. That 
its doublings are “uncanny,” as Davis says, is bound up with its 
confusions between life and death, as well as its spatializing 
and spacey effects (as Davis notes about “giving the ghost room 
to dance”). Something of spacing is latent in the word uncanny 
itself, an English supplement to the German unheimlich, un-
home-like: different and distant from home. A theory of dubjec-
tivity thus resonates with — and appropriates the problematic 
premises of — McLuhan’s argument that the environment of 
new media, which for him television exemplified (as Videodrome 
parodies), is predominantly an “acoustic space”:
McLuhan believed that electronic media were subverting 
visual space by introducing “acoustic space:” a psychological, 
social and perceptual mode that eroded visual space’s logical 
clarity and Cartesian subjectivity, returning us electronically 
to a kind of premodern experience — what he once called, 
with characteristic sloppiness, “the Africa within.” (Davis, 
“Roots and Wires”)
Davis brings McLuhan into unlikely dialogue with the black 
Atlantic theory of Paul Gilroy, and a theory of dubjection, I sup-
pose, extends this improbable discussion. As Richard Cavell has 
argued (xiii), McLuhan directed his major research questions to 
contexts of space, of surroundings, of environment; hence, for 
instance, his retroactive positioning as a founder of the field 
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of “media ecology.” Through his “translation . . . entirely into 
the video world” (Beard 132), O’Blivion occupies a simultan-
eously indeterminate space — from where (and/or when) is he 
broadcasting? — and a closely confined space — the cathode-
ray small screen. The revelatory scene that exposes O’Blivion’s 
fate as a video library is set in a high-ceilinged room, through 
which the camera pans across shelves full of tapes, suggesting 
the professor’s encyclopedic knowledge, the extent of his media 
obsession, and the more expansive space into which he has 
dubjected himself. Again aping McLuhan, O’Blivion’s indeter-
minate redistribution problematizes the spatial dimension of 
electronic remediation as a globalized space: O’Blivion inhabits 
the “strange new world” in which “television is reality and re-
ality is less than television,” a world evocative of McLuhan’s 
“global village.”
Dub is a “space craft” (Perry, qtd. in Toop 114) in that its re-
duction of an instrumental track to drum and bass opens sonic, 
conceptual, and affective space: space for a vocalist to occupy 
with lyrics, toasts, or rap; space for different instrumentals 
and sound effects; and, more abstractly, cognitive and contem-
plative space, as privileged in Rastafarian religious practice. 
(Angela McRobbie marvels at “how much thinking there is in 
black music,” citing black British critics like Gilroy and Kodwo 
Eshun who have articulated its “investment of artistry, politics, 
history, and literary voice” [43]). Dubjection translates this 
principle of spacing into practices of distribution: the dispersals, 
displacements, and deterritorializations of the remediated self 
among the myriad globalized networks of electronic media. And 
these distributions achieve global (and even, technically, extra-
terrestrial) reach in the affordances of electronic and digital 
information and communication technologies. Differentiating 
between virtual and networked subjectivities, Bolter and Grusin 
describe the latter as “made up both of that self that is doing 
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the networking and the various selves that are presented on the 
network” (Bolter and Grusin 233).
As a remediated remix of the poststructuralist theory of 
subjectivity, the dubject articulates and reorganizes its embodi-
ments, amplifies and proliferates its doubling effects, and ex-
tends and redirects its spacing movements. In the figure of the 
dubject converge several curious contexts — the cut-and-mix 
principles of black Atlantic music, continental theory, Canadian 
media culture, and the technoscapes of postmodern globaliza-
tion — and it engages other theoretical and literary contexts, 
such as science fiction, Afro-Futurism, diaspora studies, science 
and technology studies, gender theory, and post-humanism, 
which the present essay gives me scope only to flag for further 
investigation.
O’Blivion finds numerous doubles, antecedents, and avatars 
in fantastic and speculative cultural production generally, 
and Canadian science fiction specifically. From the Gothic 
tradition of Shelley’s Frankenstein and Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde, the doppelgänger figure transforms, in modern 
and postmodern science fiction, into the figure of a digitized, 
downloadable consciousness. Bolter and Grusin track this 
figure through “virtual reality” films like Strange Days (1995) 
and Johnny Mnemonic (1995), in which “a character casts his or 
her mind into the computer, usually to have it trapped there 
or to exchange or merge it with other minds” (247). Similar 
films include Tron (1982), The Matrix (1999), and the television 
programs Battlestar Galactica (2004–9) and Max Headroom 
(1987–88).
In Canadian science fiction literature, we find similar fig-
ures of digital dubjection. William Gibson (who wrote the 
aforementioned Johnny Mnemonic) adapts this figure exten-
sively. In his 1984 novel Neuromancer, one character is a dead 
computer hacker who has been “recorded” as “a construct, a 
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hardwired ROM cassette replicating a dead man’s skills, obses-
sions, knee-jerk responses” (76–77). In Peter Watts’s 2006 novel 
Blindsight, traditional burial rites have been superseded by a 
virtual Heaven, a “utopian environment” to which “Ascend-
ants” upload their personalities for indefinite occupation (33). 
In Nalo Hopkinson’s short story “A Habit of Waste,” the main 
character has transplanted her personality to a new body and 
encounters the occupant of her old one: “Here was someone 
wearing my old cast-off. . . . If she couldn’t afford cloning, the 
doctors would have just downloaded her brain into any donated 
discard” (para. 4). Cory Doctorow’s 2003 Down and Out in the 
Magic Kingdom imagines a high-tech future in which the nar-
rator has “seen the end of death” (8) in the advent of personal 
memory “backup” systems (15) that let an individual upload his 
or her subjectivity to a database and download it into a succes-
sion of customizable bodies.
Among these examples, Gibson’s and Watts’s images seem 
closer to the movement of dubjection tracked here and exem-
plified by O’Blivion. In Hopkinson’s and Doctorow’s stories, 
bodies are interchangeable but still indispensable “storage 
media” for subjects. Like those of Gibson’s “construct” or 
Watts’s “Ascendants,” O’Blivion’s solution is more drastic for 
deterritorializing the corporeal body as the privileged seat of 
subjectivity. The movement of dubjection appears to remix a 
subject’s investments and positions — its psychic interiority 
and social interactions — moving the preponderance of these 
from that privileged, traditional site, to remediated sites of 
remote communication and representation. Such remixing may 
not necessarily entail physical death, but it problematizes what 
one considers life. In light of the above, let us consider in more 
detail some samples of Canadian media culture that flesh out 
the bare bones of dubjectivity articulated here.
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P O N T Y P O O L ’ S  A B J E C T  D U B J E C T S
In addition to the exemplary O’Blivion, Canadian film has 
furnished a more recent and very different cinematic story of 
dubjectivity: Bruce McDonald’s Pontypool, a film adaptation of 
Tony Burgess’s Pontypool Changes Everything (1998). Like Video-
drome, it is grotesque and satirical, formally and contextually 
quite removed from Hollywood’s more formally formulaic and 
ideologically conservative representations of the remediated 
and redistributed self (as in Strange Days and The Matrix).
Pontypool is a horror film about a small-town Ontario radio 
station beseiged by zombies. The book on which it is based, 
Burgess’s “autobiographical” novel, Pontypool Changes Every-
thing, merits some accompanying discussion, in the context 
of a theory of the dubject. Both the book and the film narrate 
approximately the same story of an infectious outbreak turning 
the populace into zombies. The outbreak starts in rural Ontario, 
and in the course of the story its cause eventually becomes evi-
dent as a virus communicated by communication — language use 
exposes one to infection. Burgess’s story is thus a surreal, satir-
ical allegory of the linguistic turn precipitated by structuralist 
and poststructuralist theories of language and subject forma-
tion. The book and film approach this story quite differently, not 
just in terms of their media but in terms of characterization, 
plot, and genre. The book shifts among numerous characters’ 
points of view, including major characters who do not appear 
in the film at all; the film more or less revolves around the per-
spective of its protagonist Grant Mazzy, a T V  personality in 
the book recharacterized as a radio station morning talk-show 
host in the film. The book moves the plot from the small town 
of Pontypool to the megacity Toronto; the film stays located in 
the Pontypool radio station and keeps most of the large-scale 
“zombie apocalypse” action entirely offscreen.
In terms of genre, the book assumes and insists on a doubled 
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formal character as both novel and autobiography. The book’s 
first of two parts is titled “Autobiography” (9); the second, 
“Novel” (145). But Part One is no first-person memoir of Tony 
Burgess. It opens with a short, anxious first-person reflection: 
“I have, to this day, a very persistent certainty that hidden 
inside me is the revolting knowledge of days when I wasn’t my-
self” (11). Most of Part One is a third-person narrative of one 
Les Reardon’s struggle with and escape from zombies, which 
abruptly pauses to problematize autobiography: “What is an 
autobiography? What can fairly be said to lie within its bounds, 
share in its purpose?” (116). The following chapter, “Autobiog-
raphy,” switches to a second-person account of “your” history 
of homelessness, drug withdrawal, and suicidal depression. The 
first part’s last chapter, titled “Autopsy,” returns to the zombie 
story. Part Two opens with a chapter called “Biopsy” that ex-
plains the zombie-making virus:
The virus farmed the organisms [which] evolved to the point 
where they comprehended themselves as copy machines. . . . The 
virus, fearful of this hostile extension — mechanical reproduc-
tion — jumped from the imperilled species to the imperious one. 
First, it adapted itself to life inside computer memory. (147)
And thence to human hosts. The novel thus becomes the story 
of a virus’s own dubjection, as — borne on vectors of cogni-
tion, “paradigms,” and language — it shuttles and mutates 
back and forth between human hosts and their communica-
tion media. Burgess’s fictional virus replicates in the text and 
as text, through doubling and spacing, repetition and deferral. 
The above-quoted “Biopsy” offers a brief explanation of this 
virus’s pathology, and names the disease: “The disease is com-
monly referred to as Acquired Metastructural Pediculosis. Or, 
A MPS” (149).
Burgess supplements this first overview of A MPS pathology 
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with a more detailed description during Mazzy’s broadcast 
interview with a doctor, who explains that A MPS “gestates in 
the deep structures prior to language,” as the “primal structure 
that organizes us as differentiated, discontinuous copies of 
each other”:
The virus appears in a concept of itself . . . a common effect  
being the sensation that the present moment is a copy of 
itself. . . . Other early symptoms occur when the act of selecting 
a word becomes jammed. . . . As conditions within the person-
ality become ultra-sensitive to their own construction, there is a 
kind of sped-up production of reality. This is a compensation for, 
or an escape from, the rending of their once invisible frames. . . . 
A frightening and painful type of madness ensues. (167)
This “type of madness” turns its victims “into violent zombies. 
Cannibals” (149). To ward off infection, Dr. Rauf advises Mazzy 
that “we use as little connotative language as possible.” He says 
that “the mature virus resembles the figure of abjection” and 
that its self-replicating progeny — “the copy” — manifests in 
its host only as “a strange, full and undetectable presence” (169). 
Infected characters announce their affliction by repeating words 
and their homonyms, as though playing an absurd, grotesque 
game of broken telephone: “The zombies echo the voice in words 
they bark at the soldiers: ‘Helen!’ ‘Hello!’ ‘Help!’ They are agi-
tated by the alliteration” (69). This pathologized, abject image 
of linguistic subject formation gives way to dubject formation 
not only in the virus’s remediations but in a farcical, mediatized 
scene at the T V station where Mazzy works:
An idea developed by Big Town T V to accommodate its A MPS 
viewer . . . closed coupling involves a tight repetition, a delay 
sample that they believe would conform to the rhythm that 
A MPS consume information. . . . The technology does attract 
viewers, who are exhilarated by the idea.
A Max Headroom who cannot be cancelled. (152)
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The book proliferates dialogic and mediatized images and tropes 
of self and other as host and invader, individual and double, 
original and copy, presence and representation, living human 
and zombie cannibal. Images and tropes converge to parody the 
poststructuralist theory of the subject’s linguistic formation in 
grotesque figures of the dubject’s mimetic deformation.
Like Burgess’s book, McDonald’s film takes numerous op-
portunities to represent individuals falling victim to infection 
as they repeat and stutter the specific words on which they get 
stuck, like broken records. Burgess wrote the film’s screenplay, 
and makes a cameo appearance. The book’s roving, third-person 
narrator describes numerous large-scale social scenes, events, 
and violent conflicts featuring large groups, especially masses 
of zombies (in nauseatingly gruesome yet eerily stylized detail). 
The film eschews such scenes and literally keeps the zombie 
hordes outside the doors of the community radio station, which 
occupies a refurbished church basement. Unlike Hollywood 
films that take the “zombie apocalypse” premise as an oppor-
tunity for spectacular effects and huge crowd scenes, the mass 
zombie action in Pontypool is mostly relayed to the characters 
via different media, like telephones, broadcasts, computers, and 
military loudspeakers outside the bunkered station. (These min-
imalist strategies of cinematic remediation not only “leave more 
to the imagination” but also indicate the film’s modest, typically 
Canadian budget.) The film Pontypool replaces the book’s mass 
spectacle with tragic character drama, in scenes where main 
characters succumb to the disease in grotesque performances 
of linguistic dub, like grisly, noir Max Headrooms: repeating 
words to vary, empty, and space out their meanings, leaving 
the speakers vapid zombies that rage, vomit blood, and expire.
The film changes the story’s premise significantly, too. While 
the book explains A MPS ’s infectious vectors as “paradigms” and 
“language,” in the film, only speaking aloud in English exposes 
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one to infection and zombiehood. The main characters resort to 
writing and passing notes in order to communicate and survive, 
a remediating tactic that collapses performance and recording. 
In the denouement, one main character begins to succumb, 
repeating the word “kill” with rising anxiety and hysteria, but 
Mazzy helps her stave off infection by what might be called a 
game of word dissociation, reasoning that if getting stuck on 
a word is what renders one a zombie, then pre-emptively void-
ing that word of its meaning through a dramatized “free play 
of signifiers” acts as a kind of inoculation: “Kill is kiss! Kill is 
kiss!” (As these scenes might suggest, the film develops a more 
crowd-pleasing, less nihilistic plot than its print source, which 
spares neither Mazzy nor most of Ontario’s population.)
The changed premise also affords McDonald opportunities 
for satirical commentary on Canadian culture. Since English 
transmits the virus, Francophone soldiers are deployed, yet 
they too remain offscreen. We hear their amplified alerts and 
commands but never see them; Canada’s two solitudes remain 
divided — by a disease endemic to English speech. The film 
also remixes and remediates two typically Canadian public 
institutions — the community radio station that occupies a 
musty church basement — and turns these conflated pub-
lic institutions into a private bunker for the embattled mor-
ning talk-show team. In addition to its bicultural satire, the 
film thus satirizes Canadian forms of privatization. Why the 
church agrees to lease out its basement to the station remains 
unexplained; that it does so suggests a response to economic 
pressures and cultural shifts. The film also explains less about 
the virus’s pathology, opening the satirical possibility that it 
is not English in general but the smug, “straight-talking,” and 
“common sense” neoliberal style of corporate talk radio, aped 
by this community station and its host, Mazzy, that is turning 
listeners into raging zombies. Despite its aesthetic and thematic 
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departures from zombie movie norms, Pontypool still visualizes 
the zombie as an anonymous copy of its horded counterparts, 
which, taken together (as they usually are), strike a mass pose 
of abject dubjection. The book, in contrast, individually char-
acterizes many of the zombies encountered even in passing 
situations: “The A MP who is having this dream now is lying on 
the floor . . . sail[ing] on for the rest of his natural life striving 
towards his goals, different now, surely very different” (165). 
And, also like other horror films, Pontypool concentrates its 
dramatic plot on a gradually dwindling number of more fully 
realized main characters.
Mazzy is the focalizing protagonist common to both book 
and film, and, in the latter, his role is different and more prom-
inent than in the former; however, in both texts he is charac-
terized predominantly as a media personality, an identification 
that interpellates him as an exemplary dubject. Towards the 
film’s conclusion, he affirms, in a hard-boiled, triumphant tone, 
“I’m still here” — significantly broadcasting these words via 
the station booth mic and thus mediatizing and dispersing his 
insistence on cognitive integrity and corporeal survival.
This preliminary theorizing of dubjection has focused so far 
on fictional cases from cultural productions across media, but 
chiefly from cinema. However, we see evidence of dubjection not 
only among cultural productions but also among cultural produ-
cers. On this note, let us turn, in closing, to just a few examples 
of dubjectivity as a transnational remediation of the Canadian 
cultural producer’s own, historical self. For if the characteriza-
tions of dubjects in Videodrome and Pontypool suggest some of 
the distinctly Canadian parameters for a theory of dubjectivity, 
these parameters also spotlight some paragons of dubjection 
among Canada’s cultural producers and luminaries.
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T H E  I N V I S I B L E  A N D  V I S I B L E  H A N D  O F  A T W O O D
In her more recent science fiction novels, Margaret Atwood has 
shown an uncanny, unnerving sense of timing. Oryx and Crake, 
Atwood’s dystopian novel of humankind’s extermination via 
a viral pandemic plotted by a rogue geneticist, made its debut 
simultaneously with that of S A R S. Its sequel, The Year of the 
Flood, in which the flood refers to the aforementioned disease, 
was released in the year of the latest influenza pandemic. At-
wood toured widely to promote Oryx and Crake yet tellingly 
cancelled an appearance during the peak of the outbreak in 
Toronto, the North American city hit hardest by S A R S. During 
this 2003 tour, Atwood “came up with the idea for the Long-
Pen,” a “remote autograph technology” that could provide “a 
less taxing way to promote her books and connect with fans” 
(Wolframe 13).
Atwood went on to invent and incorporate a company for the 
LongPen, a machine that remotely replicates someone’s hand-
written signature. The device literally stands in for the author 
at a book reading and signing event, paired with an interactive 
webcam or teleconferencing interface that allows the author 
and fan to see and talk to each other. Atwood invented the 
LongPen to reduce the carbon footprint, as well as the personal 
stress, of book tours, although it has other legal and business 
applications. And as researchers like Julie Rak and Phebe Wolf-
rame have shown, the LongPen also has cultural functions and 
implications that make it legible here as a form of dubjection. 
Wolframe argues that Atwood uses the LongPen “to negotiate 
with the deathly specters of both celebrity and authorship” (14) 
and that it is, in a word, spooky:
The LongPen is a way to project a sort of technologically 
advanced version of an astral body. . . . [It] is spooky precisely 
because it forces the reader to question the realness of their 
author encounter; fans meet the author through a screen,  
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and their book is signed by a seemingly autonomous robot  
arm (24, 27).
Atwood has written and spoken about authorial celebrity as “a 
living death which splits the writer into public (spectral) and 
private (living) versions of themselves” (Rak 7). Wolframe re-
counts a telling anecdote in which Atwood, unable to attend a 
fundraising function in 1982, “created a life size ‘Peggy doll’ who 
attended the event in her stead. The doll had a tape recorder in 
its purse, which played a recording of Atwood voicing plausibly 
evasive statements such as ‘Oh, I wouldn’t really have time to 
do that’” (25). The year before Atwood invented the LongPen, 
she published Negotiating with the Dead, reflections on writing 
that include suggestive pretexts for the thinking that developed 
the device. One chapter, on the writer’s public and private roles, 
is titled “Duplicity: The Jekyll Hand, the Hyde Hand, and the 
Slippery Double” (qtd. in Wolframe 18). Atwood also advises 
the reader to “pay no attention to the facsimiles of the writer 
that appear on talk shows” (qtd. in Wolframe 25). Subsequently 
reflecting on public reactions to the LongPen, Atwood wryly 
notes the Gothic and grotesque associations attached to its 
“threat of the Monster Body Part” (qtd. in Wolframe 18). And 
yet to promote and legitimize the LongPen, Atwood describes it 
(in McLuhanesque terms) as “an extension of the Self, just as . . . 
the pen [is] of the hand” (qtd. in Wolframe 16). Her own writing 
on the technology evinces a tension between apprehending its 
uncanny effects and appreciating its instrumental affordances. 
Wolframe foregrounds the LongPen’s problematization of the 
self, of the literary work, and of their occasional conflation: 
“The LongPen, like many of Atwood’s other works, has a place 
in a historical lineage, in the world of technology, in the realm 
of the spooky and the speculative, and in discourses of the 
self” (26). Hence the LongPen’s compelling place in a theory of 
dubjectivity.
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“A  T O T A L  R E T H I N K I N G  O F  T H E 
N A T U R E  O F  I N D I V I D U A L I T Y ”
As the primal scene of the LongPen’s invention, the production 
of Oryx and Crake provides an intertextual bridge to our last case 
study in dubjection: Toronto’s virtuoso pianist, Glenn Gould. As 
the novel’s narrator, Jimmy, remembers of first meeting Crake: 
“Crake wasn’t Crake yet, at that time: his name was Glenn. 
Why did it have two n’s instead of the usual spelling? ‘My dad 
liked music,’ was Crake’s explanation . . . ‘he named me after 
a dead pianist’” (84). Atwood claims that the “dreaded author 
tour” prompted her to conceive of the LongPen; Gould also tired 
quickly of touring performances and the concert-hall economy 
that demanded them. He was alienated by the scene: “As I look 
back on all those years it seems as though some other person 
did all that” (“Ecstasy” 331). Gould’s profession had ensconced 
concerts as the test and affirmation of authentic virtuosity, but 
Gould himself began to attack them, with reasoned and combat-
ive critique, as the antithesis of artistic achievement in an age 
of mechanical reproduction. Like Atwood, Gould developed an 
eminently dubjective solution to the problem of a demanding 
and exhausting live performance schedule — but a more radical 
solution. Whereas Atwood has introduced a supplementary, 
dubjective proxy for authorial performance, Gould just dropped 
performance altogether and retired to the recording studio and 
the broadcast booth:
Working to the microphone . . . is a very easy thing for me,  
a very natural thing. Any other kind of projection now seems 
very strange to me. The difference between my first Goldberg 
recording [1955] and this one [1981] shows up in such things 
as Variation Fifteen. . . . I can no longer recognize the person 
who did that. (“Ecstasy” 332)
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In the mid-1960s, Gould caused a sensation when it became 
apparent that he was quietly abandoning live concert perform-
ances and tours, as well as speaking engagements, to focus 
strictly on studio production and radio broadcasting. Gould, 
in effect, dubjected his public persona, abdicating the expecta-
tions of music performance and the apparatuses of cultural 
and commercial capital that had installed live performance as 
the standard for taking a musician’s measure. Opposing these 
apparatuses as obsolete and irrelevant to art, Gould articu-
lated a critical position on the affordances and refinements of 
recording, in opposition to the aura and technical deficiencies 
of concerts.
His major statement of this case is the 1965 C B C  radio 
documentary he produced, “Dialogue on the Prospects of Re-
cording”: “In the electronic age the art of music will become 
much more viably a part of our lives. . . . The audience would 
be the artist and their life would be art” (“Prospects” 353). 
Gould’s argument about mechanical reproduction is to music 
what Walter Benjamin’s is to the visual arts (although Gould 
was likely unaware of Benjamin; his argument derived more 
explicitly from McLuhan’s media theory). In the documen-
tary, Gould argues that new electronic media represent a more 
private, individualized, and aesthetically satisfying future of 
music in contrast to the outmoded public “museums” of live 
performance that, for him, no longer lay claim to the optimal 
appreciation of music. Gould echoes Benjamin on the arbi-
trariness and hegemony of aura (he cites a wartime forger of 
Vermeer paintings, Hans van Meegeren, as a “private hero” 
[341]); he echoes Barthes’s “death of the author” in positing the 
declining relevance of authorial biography — tied to concert 
tradition — in appreciating music; and he anticipates both 
scholars like Jacques Attali and DI Y  music practices like rap 
on the rise of the home listener as, increasingly, a participant 
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and even composer (what we now call a prosumer) in his or her 
own right. As a result, he concludes, “this whole question of 
individuality in the creative process . . . will be subjected to 
a radical reconsideration” (352), with implications for society 
and culture more generally: “I believe that the ultimate gift of 
electronic culture to art will be a total rethinking of the nature 
of individuality” (“Forgery” 231).
Gould’s vision of art, its purpose, and the artist’s role are 
inextricably mixed with his views on recording, all of which 
identify him as an exemplary dubject. Almost as famous for 
his personal eccentricities as for his musical talent, Gould fre-
quently represented himself in such self-alienating terms and 
radically dubjected his personality and persona in his piano 
playing, in his recording and broadcasting, and in interviews. 
Reflecting on his “secret in playing the piano,” Gould said “I 
need to feel that these are really not my fingers . . . I have to 
find a way of standing outside of myself while at the same time 
being totally committed to what I’m doing” (“Ecstasy” 333). 
Gould freely admitted a categorical preference for mediation 
over presence: “I much prefer to have a conversation like this 
one on the telephone rather than in person. For me the presence 
of people is a distraction” (333). Gould also often scripted and 
published interviews with himself, as in the mise-en-abysmal 
“Glenn Gould Interviews Glenn Gould About Glenn Gould,” with 
its feedback loop of ironic reflections on Gould’s “radical career 
departure” into “a total immersion in media” (317). It is argu-
able, too, that Gould’s claims for the “pluralistic values which 
electronic forms assert” (“Prospects” 341; emphasis added) open 
his remediated doubling and spacing of his own several selves 
to postcolonial interpretation as an articulation of Canadian 
media culture and Canadian multiculture.
The apotheosis of Gould’s dubjectivity is the Voyager 2 space 
probe, which carries his recording of a selection from Bach’s 
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Well-Tempered Clavier with other “music from Earth” on the 
ambassadorial phonograph sent with the probe (see “Music”). 
Like Atwood’s LongPen, Gould’s representative and replayable 
presence aboard Voyager 2 provides a striking historical rather 
than fictional example of the technological-transnationalist 
dubject of the postmodern mediascape. The satellite preserves 
Gould’s performance for an unimaginable posterity: an audible 
etching of European baroque music on a gold-plated but out-
dated storage device, which may not ever be played, recruited for 
a space mission launched by the most symbolically imperialist 
and “SF -capitalized” (see Fisher) institution in the US A — an 
interstellar mission that exited the solar system in 1989, will 
terminate its telemetric transmissions in 2025, and yet may 
one day remain the sole surviving artefact of modern human 
civilization.
Spinning into the farthest space yet reached by any human 
project, sounding the limits of representation, Gould’s historical 
case rivals O’Blivion’s fictional one as an exemplar of dubjec-
tivity, this remediated remixing of subjectivity that continues 
to reverberate through Canadian culture. The figure of the 
dubject and the movement of dubjection suggest a heuristic 
device for interpreting cultural images of self and other in 
the hypermediated, overdeveloped world; however, the fact 
that the fictional dubjectivities of Videodrome and Pontypool 
find historical counterparts like Atwood and Gould broach 
the theory’s broader social applications. Articulating Canada’s 
political economy of compromised sovereignty and its history 
of colonization by various cultural and media empires, the in-
carnations and iterations of dubjection position the individual 
citizen as a commodity produced by competing intellectual 
property claims, the consumer of media as what media them-
selves consume, the organic self reorganized and reproduced 
by its technological others.
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